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Abstract: This research paper explores the generic barriers which govern supply 
chain integration. Four automotive cases illustrate the motivations and barriers that 
emerged during the implementation phase of collaborative ICT ventures. The 
results indicate the reasons for failure of ICT as the solution to collaborative supply 
chain integration. We show that ICT in relation to supply chain collaboration 
(SCC) is still at an embryonic stage of development. Recent examples of e-
business initiatives are used to develop further a framework of barriers for supply 
chain integration and collaboration based in the automotive sector.  The barriers to 
successful integration and collaboration identified in this research include system 
standards, legacy systems and interoperability, cost-benefit sharing, and inter-
organizational trust. The paper concludes by suggesting that for ICT ventures to be 
successful in achieving requirements, inter-firm relationships must be a first 
consideration, certainly before implementing technology.  
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1 Customer demand and collaborative leadership   
 
The failure of several high profile Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment 
(CPFR) implementations suggest that supply chain integration is still only a promise in 
more traditional manufacturing sectors such as automotive. Despite considerable efforts 
by OEMs and suppliers through initiatives such as Covisint, there are few signs of true 
customer demand responsiveness and collaborative supply chains based on joint decision 
making. Despite the existence of success stories (Smith, 2006), this is a surprising 
revelation, particularly given the coverage in academic and trade press regarding the 
perceived benefits of information sharing through web-enabled CPFR.  
Attempts to adopt a joint planning and decision-making strategy have been 
largely unsuccessful to date. Stank et al, (1999) failed to verify the existence of even 
broad based performance enhancements related to the implementation of CPFR even 
though they conceded that overall costs could be reduced. Barriers such as industry 
structure, silo management and product complexity inherent in the supply network all 
impact on managers’ ability to implement collaborative planning systems which enable 
synchronisation of responsive demand across automotive supply networks.  
Much has been made of the benefits accrued by firms in the FMCG, computer, 
and retail sectors adopting ICT to boost competitiveness through responsive inter-
  
organisational demand management (i.e. Tesco, Dell, Zara). The automotive industry 
OEMs have also made significant strides to reduce the order fulfilment cycle using ICT 
to connect limited areas of the supply network, e.g. component manufacture with vehicle 
assembly, and vehicle distribution with dealer sales. The industry constantly looks to new 
frontiers to achieve competitive advantage at a time when over-capacities and eroded 
profits threaten firms’ very existence, for example by following the commonly stated 
goal to only build vehicles to customer demand. While the argument for shifting away 
from make-to-stock towards a locate-to-order and build-to-order approach is well 
established (Holweg, 2005), the success factors governing implementation of inter-
organizational information systems are neither clear in the literature nor widely 
disseminated. This is astonishing when the industry depends on the manufacture and 
distribution of goods which require the synchronisation of hundreds of supply partners, 
thousands of components, and millions of potential product variants per customer order.      
 
 
2 Literature review: ICT and inter-organizational IS adoption 
 
The role of ICT across industry supply chains has traditionally focused on the fields of 
economics, co-ordination, and competition (Clemons, 1992; Konsynski, 1990; Porter, 
1985). Economic benefits are related to the reduction in transmission charges and 
administrative costs, such as $200 million savings by the Chrysler Corporation 
(Mukhopadyay, 1995). Co-ordination benefits arise from the tight coupling and speed of 
exchanging information leading to efficiencies between firms such as reduced inventory 
Stank et al, 1999). Competitive advantage stems from gaining access through ICT to 
diversified markets and leveraging key resources in new areas using economies of scale 
and scope (Porter & Miller, 1985)  
The adoption of information systems not only changes the way a firm competes, 
but also enables technology to be used as a ‘competitive weapon’ against other firms Ives 
& Learmonth, 1984).  Webster (1995) provides a classic description of this phenomenon 
in the automotive industry. The case reveals the high costs of investing in bespoke EDI at 
the time and which is used as a competitive weapon to preserve the power of dominant 
stakeholders i.e. the vehicle manufacturer, thereby locking suppliers into procurement 
relationships and keeping competitors out of them.   
An alternative perspective to ICT as a competitive weapon is an enabler of 
cooperation that provides a stable platform for inter-organizational collaboration. Ciborra 
(1993) proposes reforms of the relationships with suppliers, customers and other partners 
based on a mix of organizational forms: teams, markets and hierarchies where technology 
can be harnessed to shape businesses and increase market transparency.   
Supply chain relationships today have, generally speaking, advanced from 
competitive to collaborative (Bowersox & Closs, 1996). This is reflected by a shift in 
inter-organizational systems literature in the 1990s that describes the role of information 
technology as ‘enabling the transition from inter-firm competition to cooperation’ 
(Kumar & van Dissel, 1996). These are described as information and communication 
technology systems that transcend legal enterprise boundaries and imply a high level of 
cooperation and coordination. Their classification of system types identifies the 
arguments for potential conflict and hence possible strategies for containing conflict. 
Similarly, Hart & Saunders (1997) study electronic relationships between organizations, 
particularly the role of power and trust in EDI adoption. They posit computer networks 
are increasingly adopted to support the flow of information with ‘their use both 
influencing and having consequence for inter-organizational relationships’.   
  
It is often argued that ICT will reshape the automotive industry. True, the car 
business is ripe for revolution being poorly equipped to thrive in the 21st century and 
with chronic debt and overcapacity problems, where ‘…about half of the industry is 
regularly incapable of earning a decent return on its invested capital’ Economist 
(2004a). Yet several false summits have already been encountered. First, the arrival of 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) in the 1990’s has not proved as successful as first 
anticipated, with around half of customers across all sectors believing they paid more 
than the system was worth (Vance, 2003). Second, the promise of the e-commerce 
revolution, driven by visions of virtual organizations and the digital economy (Lapidus, 
2000; Tapscot et al., 2000), is taking longer to materialise than expected. Despite 
optimism in business-to-customer (B2C) systems in sectors such as retail, groceries, and 
music (Economist, 2004b), the adoption of business-to-business (B2B) systems by firms 
in traditional manufacturing industries such as automotive face considerable barriers 
(Howard et al, 2006).  
In summary, barriers research can be traced to early inter-organizational systems 
(IOS) literature that considers the interchange of information as the basis of all activity 
Barret & Konsynski 1982).  In their assessment of the impact of IOS Barret and 
Konsynski describe ‘factors of concern’ as how new technologies are introduced into the 
firm and the resultant effects on organizational structure, users, and the IT department. 
Early attempts to unify the fragmented models of information system implementation 
reveal five categories of factor: individual, structural, technological, task-related, and 
environmental (Kwon & Zmud, 1987).  Hence, planning for IOS-related change requires 
clear strategic objectives and a systematic means of identifying project constraints, 
barriers, or features (Earl, 1989). Even today the planning, implementation, and 
maintenance of an e-procurement programme across supply chains represents a 
considerable challenge (Presutti, 2003).  This situation is exacerbated by automotive 
industry stakeholders facing a whole range of different barriers to effective change 
internally and across the supply chain (Howard et al., 2006).    
 
2.1  Supply responsiveness 
 
Supply responsiveness can be thought of in two ways. The first deals with how supply 
chains respond to raw market demand signals. Many automotive manufacturers strive to 
meet customer expectations through build to order.  Supply chains are being engineered 
to cope with real demands rather than forecast based production. The alternative 
perspective sees supply chains as needing to deal with fluctuating demand resulting from 
managerial interventions and incompatible planning and information systems. 
Responsiveness in the supply base is needed for both these scenarios.  
Fisher (1997) distinguishes between supply chains that are market responsive 
and those that are physically efficient. The former is aimed at a quick response to 
unpredictable demand and thus requires high supply chain flexibility. This concept is also 
specified by Christopher (1999) as agility, whereby agility should be obtained through 
the integration of other elements of the supply chain such as external suppliers. Supply 
responsiveness, in an automotive context, has been defined as “the ability of a 
manufacturing system or organisation to adapt to changes and requests in the 
marketplace” (Holweg, 2005). In order to gain increased supplier responsiveness some 
authors claim that automotive companies require co-location, single sourcing, selection 
based on flexibility, internal collaboration (between purchasing and production) and 
integration with logistics providers (Tachizawa, 2005). Other sources state process 
flexibility, e.g. the ability to change schedules on a frequent basis is necessary 
  
(Krajewski, 2005) and information system flexibility “the ability to align information 
system architectures with the changing information needs of the organisation as it 
responds to changing customer demand” (Duclos, 2003). Not only do supply chains have 
to deal with changing demands from the market, but the lack of timely and accurate 
information exchange causes its own problems. For example, this leads to one of the key 
topics in supply chain management: the bullwhip effect.  
Lee (1997) explains that demand is often amplified up the supply chain due to 
the way that orders are processed and passed on by each link in that chain. One of the 
main causes of this effect is demand forecast updating, whereby demand planning 
information is passed only sequentially up the supply chain, creating large swings in 
expected demand further upstream. The authors suggest that there are a number of actions 
that can reduce the bullwhip effect including using Point Of Sale (POS) data, sharing 
sales, capacity and inventory information, and Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Thus a 
key aspect of integration through ICT is the ability to provide real time information on 
product availability, inventory levels, shipment status and production requirements and 
allowing collaborative planning among supply chain partners by sharing information on 
demand forecasts, production schedules (Min & Galle, 2003). Reconciling actual market 
demands (which implies wide swings due to seasonality and customer purchasing habits) 
with volatile demands because of amplification throughout the supply chain, requires a 
renewed focus on enabling information systems and technologies.   
 
 
2.2  Supply Chain Collaboration 
 
Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC) has raised its profile in supply chain management 
literature recently and is now being discussed with particular reference to ICT. Indeed, 
Akkermans et al., (1999) suggests that ‘focusing on supply chain strategies is the next 
frontier in organisational excellence’. Frohlich & Westbrook (2001) agree: the most 
successful manufacturers carefully link their internal processes to external suppliers and 
customers.  Nevertheless, Ashayeri & Kampstra (2005) suggest that successful supply 
chain collaborations are rare, even though SCC is now widely recognised as one of the 
most pressing needs in supply chain management.  
In a model scenario, supply chain partners would co-operate to restructure 
business practices, as necessary using available technology, and provide ‘customers with 
products and services better/faster/cheaper than ever before’ Stank et al., 1999).  ICT is 
clearly important because historically the automotive sector has relied on forecast 
information which creates uncertainty and is also influenced by promotions, product 
variety, changing demand patterns and competitive pressure. Accuracy can be improved 
by using real-time data (Childerhouse et al., 2003) and where information from the buyer 
is important to the supplier’s inventory and production decision.  
  Gunasakaran (2005) argues the Build-to-Order Supply Chain (BOSC) is also 
now being actively pursued in several different industries, and describe studies that 
support ICT role in implementing them. Yet the adoption of these processes and 
technologies is problematic, and BOSC may well fail unless practical implementation and 
firm interoperability can be improved. 
  The current state of SCC ICT is well documented in the literature; however, a 
number of initiatives are notable. Quick Response (QR) was implemented in the 1980s in 
the apparel industry whereby sales data was electronically transmitted to suppliers to 
trigger production of new items to replenish retailers (Hunter, 1990). Efficient Consumer 
Response (ECR) was a response to supply chain inefficiencies (Barratt & Oliveira. 2001), 
  
where the supply chain was required to transform from a ‘stock-push’ to a ‘customer-
pull’ system, requiring the supply chain to collaborate in order to replenish stock.  The 
concept originates from just-in-time and just-in-sequence strategies typified by current 
automotive supply chains. ECR cuts costs by eliminating activities that don’t add value.  
Continuous Replenishment Planning (CRP) shares information from the downstream 
stock situation regarding demand, stock and delivery times, allowing smoother flow from 
suppliers. The approach allows the supply chain to collaborate by substituting inventory 
with information (van Hezewijk & van Assen, 2005).  VMI is also a popular supply 
strategy that is now held in high esteem in a number of market sectors including the 
automotive and aerospace industries because customers often find it beneficial to 
‘delegate responsibility for the replenishment process to the supply chain’ (Disney & 
Towhill, 2003).  In terms of performance, however, the key performance measure is no 
longer delivery time, but the availability and turnover of inventory. In a similar way, 
Factory Gate Pricing (FGP) transfers the responsibility and control of replenishment to 
the retailer with the additional advantage of reduced transportation cost for the customer. 
Further, the CPFR concept (Fliedner, 2003) attempts to fill some of the gaps left by 
previous SCM practices, such as the necessity to hold high stock levels to ensure product 
availability; multiple forecasts within supply chain; the link between promotions and the 
sales forecast; changing demand patterns and general synchronisation of supplier efforts. 
 Based on the VICS process model (Barratt & Oliveira. 2001), the focus of CPFR 
is enhanced by encompassing planning, forecasting and replenishment processes in one 
package, where much of its popularity is attributable to the impressive results reported by 
early programs. However, CPFR takes a number of different forms across supply 
networks and can be a laborious process to implement, especially when supported by 
inadequate systems. For example, forecast reconciliation remains a frustrating, error-
prone process without automated exception management. Most current solutions also fail 
to scale adequately as a manufacturer adds more retailers and the problem is made worse 
by an inability to integrate with back-end production systems. Assumptions are often 
made over the implementation of ICT projects as being relatively straightforward. Yet 
this ignores the fundamental problems of sustaining these collaborative ventures across 
long time periods, involving diverse stakeholders with a variety of multi-level barriers 
and conflicting motivations. 
In summary, the literature is full of examples where IOS adoption is fraught 
with difficulties, from ERP implementations running over budget, to organizational 
objectives simply not being met. While earlier literature identifies firm level barriers to 
IOS adoption, this continues to evolve as new cases of failure emerge. In this research, 
the focus on supply responsiveness by automotive firms highlights the huge challenges 
faced in providing appropriate technological and social support for the project. 
Implementing responsive supply networks through supply chain coordination adds a new 
layer of complexity through which managers must navigate to ensure success. Hence, the 
aim of the research is to apply current knowledge of IOS barriers to emerging automotive 
cases seeking to achieve responsiveness, and to provide an initial framework for planning 
such initiatives in the future. 
 
 
 
3 Method  
 
  
The research examines four recent examples of failed supply chain initiatives that attempt 
to implement one or more aspects of collaborative planning.  The research design reflects 
the need to deconstruct and understand the reasons why ICT projects were not meeting 
requirements in the automotive industry.  Hence, case selection was based on known 
automotive initiatives in procurement, supply and operations.  The investigation was 
based on the objective of exploring the barriers governing supply chain integration.  This 
was operationalised through structured interviews and onsite workshops, followed by the 
development and analysis of a barriers framework (Figure 1). External validity was 
ensured through obtaining industry feedback on the initial framework and results, gained 
from multiple data sources (i.e. the OEMs and Suppliers within the initiative). Four 
supply chain initiatives were selected as examples of collaborative planning that 
subsequently failed to meet their original objectives. Based on interviews with senior 
supply chain managers at OEMs and suppliers, the research offers a multi-level 
framework of barriers to implementing collaborative, inter-organisational systems. 
  
Fig 1  Process Perspective Methodology  
 
 
 
4 Findings  
 
Despite the existence of a comprehensive process model allied with promising results 
from other sectors, widespread adoption of CPFR has not been forthcoming. This justifies 
a re-examination of the benefits and barriers. Barratt and Oliveira (2001) list the benefits 
espoused by the growing number of supporters of the CPFR process. Benefits are 
comprehensively discussed in the literature and would be attractive to any industry 
seeking clear incentives for implementation. Yet the associated barriers appear to pose 
considerable complexity for firms that are neither fully understood nor widely 
disseminated. The cases are now outlined below:  
 
Literature review
Research problem
Propositions
Conclusions
Data collection
Data reduction
Data display
Verification
Participant observation
QPID workshops
Pilot study
Conceptual framework
Industry seminars
Semi-structured interviews
Methods:
Protocol
Process:
Analysis
Reflection
  
 
4.1  Covisint 
 
Covisint was launched during the dotcom frenzy of early 2000 as the biggest and most 
powerful automotive internet trade exchange or ‘e-hub’. Announced as the beginning of a 
new era in purchasing and supply chain management, automakers poured $500 million 
into the Covisint venture that was supposed to transform the automotive industry by 
using on-line auctions and electronic parts catalogues to drastically reduce material costs. 
Founder members Ford, General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler (later joined by 
PeugeotCitroen, Renault and Nissan) anticipated significant price reductions and 
customer responsiveness by combining purchasing economies of scale and Internet 
technology. However, rival manufacturers and suppliers were already developing their 
own solutions and were reluctant to join Covisint over fears of accepting a subordinate 
role. The vision to create an on-line industry trade exchange for both suppliers and 
automakers backfired due to issues over anti-trust legislation, agreement over on-line 
software development, and reluctance from suppliers to subscribe to a system that 
overnight could slash their component prices. As other trade exchanges proliferated, 
Covisint’s vision of offering collaborative procurement, lower transaction costs, and the 
introduction of a universal system standard began to diminish (Helper & McDuffie, 
2003). In January 2004, the e-hub that was supposed to transform the automotive industry 
was disassembled and put up for sale (ANE, 2004). It is currently being restructured by 
an IT provider in the USA to offer on-line services in healthcare. 
 
4.2  Everest 
 
Everest was planned as private exchange that would eventually replace all Ford 
production and non-production purchasing systems around the world, including links to 
all major suppliers. In 2000, Ford procurement IT consisted mainly of mainframe legacy 
systems and client databases built up over a long period offering only partial visibility in 
the US and virtually none across Ford’s Premier Automotive Group subsidiaries in 
Europe: Jaguar, Aston Martin, Land Rover and Volvo. The ambitious nature of Everest 
presented huge potential for savings where materials spending totalled around $100 
billion a year. This meant subsidiaries such as Swedish automaker Volvo was obliged to 
integrate a large-scale e-procurement hub into its business despite the design being based 
on US processes and organizational structure that was very different to its own. The scale 
of Everest created huge difficulties because it required compatibility not only at a 
technical standards level, but also adherence to common business practices. Thus, the 
system roll-out encountered difficulties due to internal relations with business units in 
different regions across the world, and fundamental issues with the supply chain. 
Suppliers were reluctant to participate in a system whereby buyers could take advantage 
of increased transparency and reverse auctions. As the original scope of the system began 
to be scaled back, the project was eventually abandoned. 
 
4.3  ICON 
 
  
The ICON Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC) tool was envisaged as a repository for the 
OEMs supply requirements, inventory requirements and production capacities of each 
supplier. The idea was to promote clear visibility between levels of the supply chain, so 
anticipating production difficulties and allowing optimised stocking.  The ICON SCC-
Tool algorithms boasted dynamic adjustment of inventory levels for each component to 
meet the upcoming production needs.  Benefits for the supplier included direct access to 
the demands of the OEM and advice on supply problems via a ‘traffic light’ system. The 
tool was implemented by a number of automotive OEMs and their suppliers as an off-the-
shelf application. However, in order to meet the requirements of all the project partners, 
information was to be sent either via EDI, e-mail, automatically or manually to an e-mail 
address. Although a practical method of getting around a real problem in supply chain 
management, there were difficulties in implementing the full tool (in particular 
management of capacity information) between automotive OEMs and their suppliers, and 
was recently discontinued by them.  
 
4.4  LiNet 
 
Aimed primarily at the SME sector, LiNet intended to extend and harmonise the supply 
function by creating seamless supply management systems.  LiNet commenced in 2000 
as an attempt to capture the requirements of both OEM and suppliers perspectives and 
derive the requirements for an ideal process.  This took the form of a ‘Conference Room 
Pilot’ (CRP). The collaborative effort was impressive with project partners including 
Audi, BMW, DaimlerChrslyer, and VW. The objective was to determine the quantitative 
and time-referred material requirements for the entire supply network. Demand planning 
was to be based on customer demands, whose data transferred by EDI. The system was 
designed to generate order advices for the material planning managers on the basis of 
primary demands. Capacity planning was to be carried out covertly by the system at each 
level of the supply network.  The CRP was designed to transform diverse formats into a 
single system making it possible to handle the supply network from every level of the 
supply chain.  LiNet was discontinued in 2003 after legal issues concerning the use of 
software were found to be insurmountable. Further to this, it became apparent that the 
standards and rules set up for the use of the Pilot could not have been transferred between 
customers and suppliers due to inter-organisational culture issues. 
 
5 Analysis and identification of barriers  
 
An examination of the four failed initiatives: Covisint, eVerest, ICON and LiNet shows a 
range of barriers that need to be addressed before commencing adoption (Table 1). 
Industry level barriers are represented by stakeholder dynamics involving power, 
legitimacy, and urgency, which mediates between the motivations to adopt information 
systems and the barriers against. Barriers which concern industry as a whole include the 
issue of resistance to e-hubs or exchanges due to the fear of price cuts, lack of trust in 
more powerful stakeholder groups, and the increasing burden of network complexity. 
Further, the competitive conflict between consortium, private, and third party e-hubs to 
increase membership does not address long-term concerns over adherence to universal 
industry standards and protocols.  
 
  
Table 1  Collaborative planning system implementation barriers (Adapted from 
Howard et al., 2006)    
 
 Covisint eVerest ICON LiNet 
E
xp
ec
te
d
 b
en
ef
it
s 
 
 Indirect price reduction  
 Direct price reduction  
 Minimise paper 
transactions  
 Electronic audit capability  
 Transaction efficiency  
 Control maverick spending  
 Reduce inventory 
costs  
 Increase supply chain 
efficiency  
 Create more strategic 
buyers  
 Cross-functional 
integration  
 Opportunity to learn 
from Ford  
 Stock level visibility 
across the whole 
supply chain 
 Capacities across 
the supply chain 
 Optimized resource planning 
between partners 
 Management of critical SC 
situation 
 Short-term cost saving potentials 
by reducing re-scheduling efforts, 
urgent transports, stock levels, 
etc. 
 Demand-oriented and functionally 
expandable  
Barriers 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
(I
nt
er
fir
m
 
le
ve
l) 
Supplier resistance to 
subscribe to reverse 
auctions and VM-owned e-
hubs 
Anti-trust legislation 
delaying launch 
Fears that suppliers will 
perceive e-hub as 
adoption of ‘arms-length’ 
business practices - 
leading to erosion of trust 
Structural issues 
(standards) over come 
through middleware data 
reformatting 
Lack of industry-wide standardisation 
commitment  
Lack of industry-wide approach to 
guarantee data security 
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
(F
irm
 le
ve
l) 
New systems must be 
institutionalised to align with 
the needs of the centralized 
purchasing commission 
Conflict from US & EU firm 
structures 
Concern over eVEREST 
limited choice of suppliers 
High cost of subscribing 
to electronic catalogues 
Low cost implementation, 
not investment, just 
service charge 
 
Lack of defined approach for cost-
benefit sharing 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
Cultural mismatch between 
US and European offices 
Employees acknowledge 
that Ford is still a 
hierarchical-style company 
Concern over Volvo’s 
unique independent 
Swedish origins being 
affected by American 
process and culture 
 
Level of trust endured 
after system switched off 
Did not share capacity 
information 
Lack of mutual trust between the 
partners with respect to data sharing 
and data abuse   
Lack of the culture of creating a 
win/win situation  
M
an
ag
er
ia
l 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
Resistance by managers 
who already have 
established purchasing 
relationships 
CEO leadership difficulties 
over the management of e-
commerce 
Current processes 
managed by paper and 
personality 
Managers fear 
redundancy through the 
supplier e-database 
Not a strategic process as 
such, not used to share 
capacity information  
Not a strategic process as such, not 
used to share capacity information 
Fast development in the ICT sector 
makes the decision makers doubt 
whether they are investing in the right  
ICT technology or not 
U
se
r 
 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
Staged implementation of 
Covisint means it is difficult 
to identify the system as a 
definitive product for users 
Operators used to bespoke 
system design means 
difficulties in adapting to a 
standard package 
User fears over the effect 
of increased transparency 
by eVEREST restricting 
the individual’s autonomy 
 
Worries over people 
losing their own way of 
working 
Usually identified before 
the alert 
Can quantify a problem, 
but reverts to telephone to 
resolve the problem, as 
before ICON 
Variety of  user requirements too 
high 
 
  
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
Decommissioning legacy 
systems 
Multiple IT legacy 
systems 
Usual website delays Lack of interoperable systems across 
the  SC 
 
Firm level barriers are also represented by the framework. Structural alignment reflects 
the difficulties for firms to align e-hubs with current organizational hierarchies and the 
associated problems of interfacing with internal purchasing and supply systems. The cost 
of e-hub subscriptions and the internal human resource issue rises in proportion to the 
number of external networks used by the firm. Cultural differences reflect the mismatch 
  
in outlook between US and European businesses brought together as an attempt to create 
closer relations by interacting via e-hubs. This means that suppliers or manufacturers 
with strong associations to brand or national identity often feel that their independence is 
threatened by generic, automated links to other organizations. The lack of leadership by 
senior management is illustrated by a general poor awareness of the potential impact of 
the Internet and the difficulties over e-hub adoption.  
User buy-in reflects the fears by people who associate the transparency of e-
hubs with a perceived threat to individual autonomy, supporting other recent studies 
(Lippert & Foreman, 2006). Procurement and materials planning and logistics system 
users are often reluctant to abandon their bespoke IT systems because of the implications 
of retraining and the uncertainty over long-term benefits from e-hubs and the stability 
offered by the status quo. ‘Accessibility’ implies the difficulties of logging on and 
navigating through password-protected sites, which are often slow, complex, and provide 
little support for the user. Legacy IT system infrastructure represents a barrier to e-hub 
adoption because of the difficulties of interfacing bespoke technology to a common 
business standard across many organizations.  
 
6 Discussion 
 
This research represents a study of barriers which is unusual as most related research 
tends to be normative and prescriptive. It adopts a critical view taken from multiple 
perspectives within the automotive industry, showing that structural, cultural, managerial, 
user and technical factors need to be overcome if collaborative planning initiatives are to 
be successful. 
  Summarising the four cases; Covisint was anticipated to improve transaction 
efficiency and provide an electronic audit capability. It failed, primarily at the interfirm 
level where supplier resistance to subscribe to fixed-duration bidding events reduced 
willingness to collaborate.  This was compounded by the inexperience of management to 
form a robust e-business strategy and ultimately led to resistance in establishing 
purchasing relationships. Everest was conceived primarily to increase supply chain 
efficiency and promote cross-functional integration.  It failed structurally because of fears 
of the reduced supplier base it would support and at a user level was perceived to 
improve transparency a little too far, whilst restricting autonomy.  Whilst ICON was 
envisaged to provide stock level visibility throughout the entire supply chain, it failed 
culturally on issues of trust allied with the systems inability to manage capacity 
information. In fact, the level of implementation meant that although it was a useful tool 
to share inventory information and provide alerts when certain thresholds were met, the 
strategic possibilities of the tool were not developed. In particular the possibility to 
monitor supply chain capacities could have provided large benefits in terms of 
proactively managing future shortages and responding to end customer demand and yet 
this function was not utilised (for reasons that cut across the barriers levels). Finally 
LiNet, which espoused to optimise resource planning and supply chain management, was 
not adopted because of the lack of industry standards combined with managerial 
hesitation over system and technology selection. A particular problem was the concept of 
cost and benefit sharing. Supply chain waste can be identified more objectively in a 
process where there is more visibility of information on inventory and capacity. Thus, 
agreements have to be made to act to reduce this waste, but this is problematic where 
multiple partners and sites are involved. In this case agreement was not reached between 
the project partners. 
  
This paper suggests that core issues such as system standardisation must be 
addressed by industry leaders as a whole, not by individual firms, in order to reduce the 
burgeoning demands on suppliers to support multiple interfaces. Perhaps an independent 
organization holds the key to closer integration of automotive information system 
networks? While government intervention seems a particularly blunt approach, there is at 
least one example: the 1980s Australian ‘Button’ programme, where strict central 
government control over EDI standards ultimately proved beneficial to the industry as a 
whole. The power of open structures such as the Internet make government or voluntary 
regulation more difficult in what is effectively an open market and may represent the only 
viable route for the automotive sector.  Already, tier 2 and 3 suppliers are enjoying the 
benefits of protocols such as XML at a fraction of the cost of vehicle manufacturer and 
tier 1 supplier bespoke EDI systems. If the issues of Internet governance can be resolved 
emerging ICT such as web-EDI and collaborative platforms, these tools offer 
considerable benefits to the industry. 
   
7.  Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the motivations and barriers to collaboration and information 
sharing across auto industry supply networks. It suggests that firms participating in 
initiatives which are web-enabled and CPFR-related must give considerable thought 
towards the barriers to successful collaboration, as well as benefits. The increasing 
requirement for responsive supply chains (e.g. build-to-order) is clearly evident, where all 
the cases explored in this investigation offered visions of an integrated and collaborative 
supply chain. Whilst the approach taken in each case appeared at the outset to be 
appropriate, during implementation each venture failed to deliver on core objectives.  
Literature continues to expound the benefits of such systems, where supply integration is 
largely dependant on electronic tools as enablers to interfirm collaboration.  Yet in reality 
this is an extremely difficult task.  
Our framework highlights the significant level of user, managerial, cultural and 
structural barriers associated with large scale ‘big bang’ ICT projects. It refocuses 
attention to the interfirm or industry level barriers, such as supply chain resistance 
because of lack of resource to support new systems, and the lack of adherence to 
universal industry ICT standards. In their attempt to emulate more information-intensive 
sectors such as FMCG, automakers and (to a lesser extent) their partners seem to have 
lost sight of the core values which make up organisational culture, structure and buyer-
supplier relationships. The framework therefore presents a practical perspective on ICT 
implementation for responsive automotive networks, with lessons which may apply to 
other manufacturing industries struggling to gain profitability in the 21st century. Future 
research seeks to explore the issues of regulating information system standards, and the 
role of trust in e-procurement. In automotive as in other industries, resolving these 
challenges means the industry as a whole must examines its current processes, whereby 
the views of all stakeholders (not just the most powerful) are considered in order to 
achieve greater levels of harmony across the network. 
 
References 
 
Akkermans H, Bogerd P, Yucesan E, Van Wassenhove L. (1999). The Impact of ERP on 
Supply Chain Management: Exploratory Findings from a European Delphi Study, 
INSEAD. (1999): Fontainebleau, France  
ANE. 2004. A decimated Covisint is put up for sale., Automotive News Europe: 17 
  
Ashayeri J, Kampstra R. (2005). Realities of Supply Chain Collaboration, Euroma - 
Operations and Global Competitivenenss: Budapest, Hungary  
Barratt M, Oliveira A. (2001). Exploring the Experiences of Collaborative Planning 
Initiatives. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics 
Management 31(4): 266-289  
Barret S, Konsynski B. (1982). Inter-Organisational Information Sharing Systems. MIS 
Quarterly. Special Issue: 93-105  
Bowersox DJ, Closs DJ. (1996). Logistical Management: The Integrated Supply Chain 
Process. McGraw-Hill: New York  
Childerhouse P, Hermiz R, Mason-Jones R, Popp A, Towill DR. (2003). Information 
flow in automotive supply chains ~ An assessment of present industrial practice. 
Journal of Industrial Management and Data Systems 103(3): 137-149  
Christopher M. (1999). Global Supply-Chain: The Role of Agility. Logistics Focus 
(September): 28-30  
Ciborra C. (1993). Teams, Markets and Systems - Business innovation and information 
technology. Cambridge University Press  
Clemons E, Row M. 1992. Information technology and industrial cooperation: the 
changing economics of cooperation and ownership. Journal of Management 
Information Systems 9(2): 9-28 
Disney S, Towill D. (2003). The effect of vendor managed inventory (VMI) dynamics on 
the Bullwhip Effect in supply chains. Int. J. Production Economics 85: 199-215 
Duclos LK, Vokurka RJ, Lummus RR. (2003). A conceptual model of supply chain 
flexibility. Industrial Management and Data Systems 103(6): 446-456 
Earl M. (1989). Management Strategies for Information Technology. P. Prentice Hall,: 
London. 
Economist. (2004a). Car Manufacturing - Ripe for Revolution, Economist: 
Economist. (2004b). E-commerce takes off, Economist: 
Fisher ML. (1997). What is the Right Supply Chain for your Product? Harvard Business 
Review 75, March-April(2): 105-116 
Fliedner G. (2003). CPFR: an emerging supply chain tool. Industrial Management & 
Data Systems 103(1): 14-21 
Frohlich MT, Westbrook R. (2001). Arcs of integration: an international study of supply 
chain strategies. Journal of Operations Management 19: 185-200 
Gunasakaran A. (2005). The Build-to-order supply chain (BOSC): a competitive strategy 
for the 21st century. Journal of Operationas Management 23: 419-422 
Hart P, Saunders C. (1997). Power and Trust: Critical factors in the Adoption and Use of 
Electronic Data Interchange. Organization Science. 8(1): 23-42. 
Helper S, MacDuffie J. (2003). B2B and Modes of Exchange: Evolutionary and 
Transformative Effects. In Kogut, B. (Ed) The Global Internet Economy. Wharton 
Business School  
Holweg M. (2005). An investigation into supplier responsiveness: Empirical evidence 
from the automotive industry. International Journal of Logistics Management 
16(1): 96-119 
Howard M, Vidgen R, Powell P (2006). Automotive e-Hubs: Exploring Motivations and 
Barriers to Collaboration and Interaction. Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems. 15 (1). 51-75 
Howard M, Vidgen R, Powell P (2006). Overcoming Stakeholder Barriers in the 
Automotive Industry: Building to Order with Extra-Organizational Systems. 
Journal of Information Technology 18(1): 27-43 
Hunter A. (1990). Quick Response in Apparel Manufacturing. The Textile Institute: 
Manchester 
  
Ives B, Learmonth G. (1984). The Information System as a Competitive Weapon. 
Communications of the ACM 27: 1193 -1201. 
Konsynski B, McFarlan W. (1990). Information partnerships - shared data, shared scale. 
Harvard Business Review: 114 -120 
Krajewski L, Wei JC, Tang L-L. (2005). Responding to schedule changes in build-to-
order supply chains. Journal of Operations Management 23(5): 452-469 
Kumar K, van Dissel H. (1996). Sustainable collaboration: managing conflict and 
cooperation in interorganizational systems. MIS Quarterly 20(3): 279-307 
Kwon K, Zmud R. (1987). Unifying the Fragmented Models of Information Systems 
Implementation. In: Boland, R. J., & Hirschheim, R. A. Critical Issues in 
Information Systems Research. 
Lapidus G. (2000). Gentlemen, Start Your Search Engines. Goldman Sachs Research  
Lee HL, Padmanabhan V, Seungjin W. (1997). The Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chains. 
Sloan Management Review 38(3): 93-102 
Lippert, S.K. and Forman, H. (2006) A supply chain study of technology trust and 
antecedents to technology internalization consequences  International Journal of 
Physical Logistics and Distribution Management, 36(4): 271-288. 
Min H, Galle WP. 2003. E-purchasing: profiles of adopters and nonadopters. Industrial 
Marketing Management 32(3): 227-233 
Mukhopadhyay T, Kekre, Kalathur. (1995). Business value of information technology: a 
study of electronic data interchange. MIS Quarterly 19: 137-156 
Porter M, Millar V. (1985). How information gives you competitive advantage. . Harvard 
Business Review: 149-160 
Presutti W. (2003). Supply management and e-procurement: creating value added in the 
supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management 32: 219-226 
Smith L. 2006. West Marine: A CPFR Success Story, Supply Chain Management 
Review, http://www.manufacturing.net/scm/article/CA6317964.html:  
Stank TP, Daugherty PJ, Autry CW. (1999). Collaborative planning: supporting 
automatic replenishment programs. Supply Chain Management 4(2): 75-85 
Tachizawa EM, Gimenez C. (2005). An empirical investigation on supply flexibility. In 
K Demeter (Ed.), European Operations Management Association: 1729-1738: 
Budapest 
Tapscott D, Ticoll D, Lowy A. (2000). Digital Capital: Harnessing the Power of Business 
Webs. Nicholas Brealey.: London 
van Hezewijk B, van Assen M. (2005). Coordination in Chains and Networks, Euroma - 
Operations and Global Competitiveness: Budapest , Hungary 
Vance A. (2003). SAP costs too much - customers: www.theregister.co.uk 
Webster J. (1995). Networks of collaboration or conflict? Electronic data interchange and 
power in the supply chain. Journal of Strategic Information Systems 4(1): 31-42 
 
 
 
